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EPISTEME AND SUBJECTIVITY: THE CONTEXT DOES 
NOT SOLVE THE “GETTIER PROBLEM”
Abstract
Objective: In this essay, I will try to track some historical and modern stages of the discussion on the Gettier 
problem, and point out the interrelations of the questions that this problem raises for epistemologists, with sceptical 
arguments, and a so-called problem of relevance.
Methods: historical analysis, induction, generalization, deduction, discourse, intuition
Results: Albeit the contextual theories of knowledge, the use of different definitions of knowledge, and the dif-
ferent ways of the uses of knowledge do not resolve all the issues that the sceptic can put forward, but they can be 
productive in giving clarity to a concept of knowledge for us. On the other hand, our knowledge will always have an 
element of intuition and subjectivity, however not equating to epistemic luck and probability.
Significance novelty: the approach to the context in general, not giving up being a Subject may give us a clarity 
about the sense of what it means to say – “I know”.
Keywords: Gettier, episteme, context, Subject, knowledge.
INTRODUCTION
A classical definition of knowledge according to Pla-
to is a justified, true belief [1]. Edmund Gettier argued 
however that knowledge might be something different 
from a justified, true belief ( JTB) [2, 192–194] The dis-
cussion has been going for a long time more than half a 
century, since Gettier published his three-page essay ‘Is 
Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ in 1963. The problem 
regarding the Gettier examples, alongside the sceptical 
challenges, is among the central tasks of epistemology. 
Gettier provides two examples which aim to show that 
knowledge is something other than a justified true belief.
The majority of philosophers agree that there is no 
knowledge without justification, but this is the justifica-
tion precisely, which plays a central role in sceptical argu-
ments. The sceptics do not deny that we have true beliefs; 
the sceptic denies that our convictions can be justified. 
This leads to the assertion that when the justification of 
knowledge is necessary, we have no knowledge.
We will further analyse the examples that depict the 
historical stages in the discussion about the Gettier prob-
lem as well as the challenges about the definition of knowl-
edge and possible dissolution of the Gettier problem. 
These examples lead to the understanding of the problem.
1. Classical Gettier case and the steps to possible 
solutions
Let us begin with the original example that Gettier 
used in his 1963 essay [2, 192–194].
Smith and Jones apply for the same position. Smith 
has good reason to believe that Jones will get the position. 
Smith also knows that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket. 
From this, Smith concludes that the position will go to 
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the person with 10 coins in his pocket. The position re-
ally does go to the person with 10 coins in his pocket, 
but it was not Jones. It was Smith himself, who also, with-
out knowing it, had 10 coins in his pocket.
Smith has a real and justified belief, but one would say 
no knowledge. One can argue that the defect in Smith’s 
justification is practically obvious. Smith’s reasoning for 
his belief that the person with 10 coins would get the 
position is not good reasoning. Why does Smith think 
so? This is because Jones will get the position. But this is not 
the case. This is why it can’t be a good reason either. The 
reasons are given in the form of X because Y, and both 
parts – X and Y – have to be in correct and not wrong 
causation, and both the parts, X and Y, have to be true in 
order for the sentence ‘X because Y’ to be true too. In this 
case, Y is not true, and thus the sentence X because Y is 
also not true [3]. Consequently, the following was sug-
gested by Gilbert Harman in 1973 (‘Thought’) [4] and 
Keith Lehrer in 1964 (‘Knowledge, Truth and Evidence’) 
[5]: Justification should not be built on false premises. 
However, this does not solve the problem. Let us look at 
the next example about fake barns introduced by Alvin 
Goldman [6].
An  individual, Henry, drives through a landscape 
and sees a barn through the car window. He concludes 
from this that he drove past a barn. What Henry does 
not know is that there are many fake barns in this area. 
If Henry had known about these fake barns, he would 
not think that he’d seen a real barn. But Henry really did 
see a real barn, the only real one in the area. Henry has a 
real justified belief, and moreover his justification is not 
based on wrong premises. However, we will argue that 
Henry does not have knowledge in this situation despite 
a correct causation that led him to his belief. Henry’s jus-
tification can be destroyed by additional information. As 
a result, a condition was added to the knowledge defini-
tion by Peter Klein [7].
S knows that P, given S’s justified true belief that 
P is resistant to additional information. Henry’s justifi-
cation is, however, not so. It can be destroyed by addi-
tional information. This is why Henry has no knowledge.
But the above mentioned definition  is too strong 
and overshoots the mark as it excludes too many cases 
of knowledge, and as a result, we cannot name this defi-
nition with all the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
knowledge. It is over sufficient and over enough. Let us 
look at the Grabit example introduced by Keith Lehrer 
and Thomas Paxon [5].
The librarian sees Tom Grabit stealing a book from 
the library, and this way has a real and justified belief that 
Tom stole the book. What the librarian doesn’t know is 
that Tom has a mentally ill father in hospital. At the hos-
pital, Tom’s father fantasises that Tom has a twin brother. 
This twin brother does not really exist. Tom’s father just 
doesn’t want people to think that his only son is a thief. 
The librarian, however, knows nothing about this. What 
he knows is that Tom stole a book. But his justification is 
not immune to additional information. It is easy to sway 
the librarian away from this justification. Owing to this, 
the condition about any additional information is too 
strong as a condition. Justification should not be  im-
mune to any, but to relevant [8] additional information. 
The definitions [8]:
S knows that P, if S has a true justification for P, and 
S is justified in believing that P when his justification can-
not be undone by relevant additional information.
Or: S knows that P, if S in his true belief that P is 
personally and factually justified.
Or: S knows that P, if S has a well-justified belief that P.
One has to be clear on the terms ‘well-justified’, ‘rel-
evant additional information’, and ‘factually justified’ 
[8] to bring a fundamental reality of perspectives to the 
knowledge analysis. This is because of the nature of the 
epistemic reasons. The fact that it looks as though Tom 
stole a book is a good reason for the person who knows 
nothing of the mentally confused father and his fantasies. 
For the person who only knows about the father’s story, 
this is not a good reason. The same applies to the barn ex-
ample. The fact that it looks as though one is driving past 
a barn is a good reason for the person who knows nothing 
of the fake barns or for the person who knows of the fake 
barns and also knows that there was not a fake barn on this 
spot but a real one. For the person who only knows of the 
fake barns, the fact that it looked real is not a good reason.
The Gettier examples lay certain perspectives to us 
from which we as Subjects judge the justification of the 
another subject. And we are unsure as to how we are to 
judge these examples because of the relativity of the justifi-
cation and in the situation we forget we are the Subjects by 
ourselves, it means our own perspective becomes relative.
2. Alternative knowledge definitions
How to handle the Gettier problem? The scepti-
cal challenges also deal with the relationship between 
knowledge and justification. There may be two approach-
es for a solution to the Gettier problem — a revisionist 
approach and a descriptivist approach. The revisionists 
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generally argue in the following manner: The discussion 
over the Gettier examples shows that ordinary language 
leads to the contradictions. This is why one has to let 
such ordinary language not to use for philosophy, and 
for the goals of philosophy, to view the terms ‘true belief ’ 
and ‘justified belief ’ separately. The descriptivists, how-
ever, claim that such a separation is just a simple change 
of subject and does not solve the problem. According to 
them, one has to stick to the normal use of language. 
One encounters philosophical problems when one re-
moves everyday expressions out of their usual context 
and uses them in a strictly philosophical context. The 
use of language in the Gettier examples is pointless. The 
competent speaker is, however, able to use the language 
competently  in the relevant contexts. The question is 
here however, who is a competent speaker. So, if there is 
no pointless language, there is no Gettier problem.
Also, one has to analyse this lack of overview of the 
use of language in the Gettier examples. To do this, one 
has to analyse the ordinary use of the word ‘knowledge’. 
When one does this, one can see that there are two com-
pletely different situations in which the word ‘knowl-
edge’ is used [8].
On the one hand, when we already have the knowl-
edge, and on the other hand, when we are unknowing 
and are looking for good information. In these situations, 
we have different interests. Different knowledge analyses 
also have to be applied to these situations — an analysis 
that is not perspective-reliant, an objective knowledge 
analysis, when we ourselves have knowledge, and an-
other analysis of the knowledge has to contain a level of 
perspective-reliance when we are unknowing [8].
3. Solution to the Gettier problem in the contextual 
theories of knowledge.
Stewart Cohen [9; 13] and David Lewis [10], Mi-
chael Williams [16] defend contextualism which holds 
that knowledge is context sensitive and the truth of ‘S 
knows P’ depends contextually on where the strength 
of standards for knowledge ascriptions may be different. 
Cohen states:
Contextualism has been proposed as a way to resolve 
stubborn epistemological paradoxes. Where P is some 
common sense proposition about the external world 
(e. g., I see a zebra) and H is some sceptical hypothesis 
(e. g., I see a cleverly disguised mule), the paradox takes 
the following form:
1. I know P.
2. I do not know not-H.
3. I know P only if I know not-H.
These propositions constitute a paradox because 
each is very plausible independently, and yet they are in-
consistent jointly. Because our intuitions about knowl-
edge lead to paradox, scepticism threatens [9, 69].
There is no single unified answer to the question of 
which alternatives and in what contexts and situations 
the subject must deny, and which must confirm to as-
piring for knowledge, and true justified beliefs. The core 
of the contextualism theories of knowledge is the fact 
that the definition of importance or unimportance of 
the alternative is context sensitive. In this respect, there 
are two factors of the context — the subject’s context 
or the one who chooses between the alternatives, and 
the context of another one to whom the knowledge is 
attributed, who knows or does not know, i. e. the context 
of the subject to judgement. The level of standards, which 
are established when the judgement about knowledge or 
lack of knowledge is made, might also be considered as 
the basis for explaining contextualism.
Thus, there are two bases of contextual theories of 
knowledge:
1–The subject who knows or does not know, and the 
subject of judgement, who says that S knows P, and they 
are in different contexts;
2–Different standards are applied to knowledge in 
different contexts: a) conversational context, b) especial-
ly demanding epistemological context, and c) sceptical 
context.
Many contextualists, including Cohen and Lewis, ar-
gue that to overcome the sceptical argument, one should 
adopt various epistemic standards. According to Lewis, 
the problems begin with the sceptic’s high demands. And 
the solution lies in the ability to ignore, with supporting 
reasons, these alternatives proposed by the sceptic. Which 
ones are the relevant alternatives? Lewis proposes some 
rules here pertaining to actuality, belief, resemblance, reli-
ability, conservatism, and attention [10, 695–698].
First, there is the rule of actuality. The possibility that 
what is actually obtained could never be ignored. Thus, 
we get the subject-dependent factor that S knows that 
P is true. E. g. Lewis states:
Actuality  is always a relevant alternative; nothing 
false may be properly presupposed. It follows that only 
what is true is known, wherefore we do not have to in-
clude truth in our definition of knowledge. The rule is 
‘externalist’— the subject himself may not be able to tell 
what is properly ignored [10, 695].
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Rule 2: Everything that the subject believes in to ob-
tain must not be ignored.
A possibility that the subject believes to obtain is not 
properly ignored, whether or not he is right to believe so 
[10, 696].
There  is the rule of resemblance. The alternatives 
that are very similar, i. e. the rule of resemblance, to the 
alternative that also cannot be ignored, e. g., the rule of 
actuality. The rule of resemblance is determining. The 
third rule is the rule that might solve the Gettier prob-
lem. In the Gettier problem, there is always an alternative 
that resembles actuality, which is not eliminated by the 
subject’s evidence.
In the example of the barns, it is obvious that Henry 
cannot clear up his doubts concerning the alternative, 
which cannot be ignored. That is, it can resemble actual-
ity when he drives through an environment full of barn 
facades that look exactly like barns. The rule of resem-
blance forbids ignoring these alternatives. But here the 
main problem appears with the rule of resemblance as 
we come to the conclusion that neither the subject of 
the Gettier case nor Henry, who is in the environment 
full of fake barns, has knowledge, and the rule of resem-
blance opens up to the sceptics. The sceptical hypothesis 
resembles actuality, and thus cannot be ignored accord-
ing to Lewis’ concept of resemblance.
And here Lewis proposes a radical solution — to ig-
nore the sceptical arguments ad hoc. To call it a solu-
tion is very problematic as soon as the sceptic is sim-
ply ignored ad hoc without arguments.
One more important rule worth mentioning here is 
the rule of attention. The alternative that the subject paid 
attention to must not be ignored. As soon as the sceptic 
attracts our attention to the sceptical hypothesis, he can-
not be ignored any more. But in everyday context, when 
the sceptic does not attract our attention to some alter-
native hypothesis, everything is all right in this situation 
and other conditions of the rules of actuality, belief and 
resemblance are taken into account.
By attracting our attention to the sceptical hypoth-
esis in such a way, the sceptic excludes the knowledge 
‘S knows P’, and Lewis’s theory leads to the solution of 
the Gettier problem, but it does not solve the sceptical 
arguments, but mystifies them.
According to Cohen, Lewis theory can solve the Get-
tier problem, but the focus should be shifted from the 
subject of knowledge, to whom the knowledge is attrib-
uted, to the one who attributes the knowledge, that is to 
the subject who judges, and in such a way to reformulate 
the rule of resemblance. It means that not all alternatives 
similar to actuality should be considered, but only those, 
which are considered by the subject who judges, that is those 
which resemble actuality only for the subject who judges. 
In this case, it is not necessary to ignore the sceptical al-
ternatives ad hoc. But in this case again, we cannot solve 
the Gettier problem because here we need the subject-
who-is-inside-the-Gettier-situation-dependent factors, 
but not the factors of the subject who judges.
Thus, the theory of contextualism is not so flawless. 
So, the problem of relevance is not solved. One can try to 
solve this problem in the manner presented in the works 
of Gerhard Ernst [8; 14], Hanfling Oswald [11], and Da-
vid Clark [12] by means of analysing our interest in vari-
ous situational contexts, where knowledge is an object 
of our interest. Here the context has two components: 
1) the interest of the unknowing, and 2) the interest of 
the knowing [8; 14].
If we are in the situation of an unknowing person, we as-
pire towards a reliable subject who is a source of information 
for us and who could provide us with reliable information.
So, we can say about this subject, while we are in the 
unknowing position, that the subject S knows that P, 
when the conditions of JTB are executed; true justified 
belief — the classical terms. In this way, S can dispel our 
doubts that non-P. The relevant doubts in this case are 
those which are set up by the unknowing person.
So, what is the character of these doubts, which are set 
up by the subject of assumptions in his search for knowl-
edge (by the unknowing person)? When important vi-
tal interests are affected, the level of doubt certainly in-
creases. The second factor is the other information that the 
subject has, which is unknowing, and judging on that, if 
he/she as an unknowing subject is sufficiently convinced. 
That means that this unknowing person ascribes the 
knowledge to the subject S. He asserts that S knows that P.
The second very important context structure in the 
analysis of knowledge is the situation, where the person 
( J) who attributes the knowledge to the subject S, is the 
knowing one. For example, in a situation of an unfaith-
ful spouse or in a situation of perjury that is given by the 
subject who ascribes the knowledge. In such a situation, 
the subject S who is attributed the knowledge — in the 
proposition S knows that P — is not compelled to elimi-
nate the doubts. To be precise, his or her elimination of 
doubts for the attributing subject (let us name this sub-
ject J) does not make any sense.
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According to general philosophical contexts, and 
particularly in the context of the Gettier-problem, peo-
ple judge from one or another perspective, even when it 
comes to philosophical contexts. Without attracting the 
attention of the person judging, the contexts lead him to 
take a certain perspective. First version: The perspective of 
the unknowing, when the judging person is searching for a 
good subject-source to inform himself while judging from 
the perspective, if the informer-subject is able to eliminate 
his (the unknowing) doubts. And the second one: The 
judging person takes the place of the knowing person. The 
Gettier-problem is leading us to take the position of the 
unknowing person. Although these paradoxes specify the 
probability of a failure, we are beginning to willingly or not 
to arouse our doubts. The actor in the Gettier-case is not 
able to eliminate our doubts in the situation to which the 
Gettier-problem is leading us.
About the situation in which we want to find a reli-
able source of information: In a general context, we are 
able to take a certain perspective. In a philosophical con-
text, it all depends on the example we are confronted 
with. To which perspective does this example leads us to? 
It is not decisive if we have any cause to doubt, because 
we almost always have causes for doubts. It is decisive if 
we do it by ourselves, as subjects who judge about knowl-
edge, by paying attention to certain moments that allow 
us to doubt something.
CONCLUSION
The core of the Gettier problem is a case of deep 
philosophical problem. The sceptics’ attacks are directed 
at the justification. These attacks take away knowledge 
from us, and make our position in the world insecure 
and fluctuating. I find the approaches that concentrate 
purely on the philosophical contexts to solve the Gettier 
problems as not being real solutions. The problem has 
come about in the real, normal language. I find this to be 
a variant of sophism, which can be both destructive and 
enlightening. This is not destructive to the philosophy of 
philosophers. The philosophers are used to scepticism 
and most have good immunity, meaning that they can 
deal with scepticism in the right way.
Another situation is the space of normal language, 
and scepticism can have serious consequences specifical-
ly in this space, by making many unsure and weak-willed. 
Therefore, I find that the solution approaches which are 
within the parameters of normal language are productive. 
The approaches that only deal with purely philosophical 
contexts objectify the term ‘knowledge’ exclusively and 
lose an important part in which there is also knowledge, 
and which plays an important role in the sense of the 
expression of the will — subjectivity.
In my opinion, the approach that is inspired by or-
dinary language, the philosophy of ordinary language, 
could be more productive for the solutions to the so-
called Gettier problems. The division of the knowledge 
analysis into two knowledge definitions, one perspective-
reliant and one objective, independent of perspective, 
does not reduce that of philosophical context, which in 
my opinion is irreducible — subjectivity. The subjectiv-
ity of the expression of the will and the self-assessment as 
knowing and unknowing from the other side takes into 
account varying knowledge perspective-reliant and con-
text-sensitive variants of knowledge, and both are impor-
tant in my opinion.
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